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ARTICLES
The Impropriety of Expert Witness Testimony on
the Law
Thomas E. Baker*
Many of my law professor colleagues are taking on a new role,
that of expert witness on the law. Of course, any law professor
worthy of the title ought to have something to profess, whether
in the classroom, in law reviews, or in the courtroom, in either a
pro bono publico capacity or for hire. These are the traditional
testimonies of law professors. Some of my colleagues, however,
are being called on to play another role. They are not serving of
counselor as consultants. Rather, they are testifying in open court
on the law. They give opinions from the witness stand on the state
of domestic law, including federal law; the law of the jurisdiction
in which the court is sitting; and the relevant law of other states.
This otiosity makes no sense to me.
It is difficult to know how often this is permitted or how
widespread the practice is, but my anecdotal impression is that it
is not infrequently allowed. I am concerned that, at least in some
federal district courts, a trend may be developing toward admitting
such testimony by professors and other lawyers. My argument,
with apologies to my moonlighting colleagues, is that this practice
cannot be squared with sound federal judicial procedure. l
• Alvin R. Allison Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S. cum laude, 1974,
Florida State University; J.D. with high honors 1977, University of Florida. Member,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.
The author appreciates the helpful comments of Ronald J. Allen, Thomas A. Baker,
Daniel H. Benson (who finds this kind of footnote annoying), Charles P. Bubany, Timothy
W. Floyd, Edward J. Imwinkelried, Robert E. Keeton, Richard Lempert, Richard A.
Posner, and Jack B. Weinstein. The author also thanks Rayne Rasty for her research
assistance in the preparation of this Article. Finally, the author gratefully acknowledges
the support of a research grant from the Texas Tech University School of Law.
1. The distinction I am making should be made explicit at the outset:
The bench and bar ought to rely on the law professoriate for legal expertise.
Indeed, one good measure of published legal scholarship is its relevance. In
325
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I. BACKGROUND
KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
A. The Rules of Evidence on Opinion Testimony
The requirement that a witness testify only about personal or
firsthand knowledge, not mere personal opinion, has its roots in
medieval law.2 This requirement demands that witnesses testify
only as to "what they [actually] see and hear."3 The rule regulates
the proper basis for testimony. A venerable dictum from Coke is
frequently cited in support of this proposition. In 1622, Coke
explained, somewhat quaintly to the modem ear, that "[i]t is no
satisfaction for a witness to say that he 'thinketh' or 'persuadeth
himself.' "4 Another frequently repeated, almost hackneyed, quo-
tation used to support the general rule invokes the Delphic au-
thority of Mansfield, who said simply: "mere opinion . . . is not
evidence."S These ancient statements and their continued currency
provide evidence of the long-standing, well-established refusal to
admit testimony that is not based upon personal knowledge.6
In addition to the personal knowledge requirement, the so-called
opinion rule developed early-on in the common law and became
firmly established by the eighteenth century.7 The opinion rule,
echoing venerable concerns for limiting witnesses, provided that
witnesses may not testify about their mere personal opinions. This
rule thus regulates the form the testimony may take. Although
witnesses are generally governed by the opinion rule, expert wit-
nesses have never been subject to the rule. The opinion rule and
the use of expert testimony developed to fill a need for information
resulting from the transformation to the adversarial trial system.8
person, a professor's learning may be a valuable tool during the preparation for
litigation, when the professor serves of counsel, or when the professor appears
as the actual advocate. When a professor appears as an expert witness on the
law, however, the testimony can only serve to throw an academic monkey wrench
into the trial works.
Thomas E. Baker, Law Professors Overstep Limits-Experts Shouldn't Testify on the
Substance of the Law, TEx. LAW., Feb. 11, 1991, at 24-25. The present Article is a much-
expanded version of this earlier essay.
2. See 9 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 203,211 (1926).
3. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 11, at 26 & n.5 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
(quoting Anon. Lib. Assoc. 110-11 (1349».
4. 7 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN 'TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 1917, at 2 (1978)
(quoting Adams v. Canon, Dyer 53b).
5. [d. at 7 (quoting carter v. Boehm, 3 Burr. 1905, 1918 (1766».
6. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 11, at 26.
7. 7 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1917.
8. Mason Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414, 414-15 (1952).
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Prior to the establishment of the adversarial system, which required
that jury members have no knowledge of the issues, trials consisted
of inquisitorial hearings in which the participants were persons
with specialized experience regarding the issues in the case at bar.9
The inquisitors decided the issues based on their own information,
knowledge, and experience. JO Therefore, this "jury of experts"
decided the dispute based on their own knowledge brought with
them from outside of the courtroom. l1 Their knowledge and fa-
miliarity with the subject of the dispute was the jurors' very
qualification to decide the case.
As it developed over the centuries, the adversarial system differed
greatly from the inquisitorial hearing process. 12 The new common-
law trial system utilized an independent jury. Any knowledge
regarding the controversy resulted in disqualification of a prospec-
tive juror.13 The testimony of witnesses together with tangible
evidence thus became the sole sources of factual data on which a
verdict could be rendered. Therefore, it was incumbent upon the
witnesses to testify from personal knowledge of the matters, be-
cause the jury no longer possessed any specialized knowledge. 14
The early promulgation of the opinion rule within the modern
adversarial system was regarded as a requirement that the witness
have personal knowledge in order to testify. For example, witnesses
were "prohibited . . . from merely repeating the statements of
others who had [themselves] perceived [the incident]."ls Generally,
witnesses were also prohibited from expressing opinions based on
conjecture of the mind rather than on personal observation.16
"Ordinarily, the law insists that witnesses testify in the language
of perception. That is, they must [describe] only what they saw,
heard, felt, touched, tasted or did. "17 As the formal opinion rule
9. Id. (quoting 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 2, at 211-14).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 415.
13. Id.
14. Id. The opinion rule may also be derived, in part, from the modern preference
for the most reliable evidence, when an in-court witness, for example, quotes a document
or recites observations of perceived facts and events. See RONALD L. CARLSON ET AL.,
MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 419 (2d ed. 1986).
15. Ladd, supra note 8, at 415. There are exceptions to this general rule, of course.
See FED. R. EVID. 803, 804.
16. Charles T. McCormick, Some Observations Upon the Opinion Rule and Expert
Testimony, 23 TEX. L. REv. 109, 110 (1945).
17. James W. McElhaney, Expert Witnesses and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28
MERCER L. REv. 463, 470 (1977) (citing JON R. WALTZ, CIuMINAL EVIDENCE 298-300
(1975».
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evolved, a different expression of the same idea became common-
place: Considered functionally, it is the province of the jury to
exercise judgment, to form opinions, and to reach conclusions in
determining its verdict; the limited role for the witness is to state
facts. IS
As previously noted, the opinion rule does not apply to expert
witnesses. 19 Expert witnesses are deemed necessary to interpret and
explain data or evidence which the jurors cannot readily understand
due to their lack of specialized knowledge. The expert witness is
aptly considered to serve as an explainer and a teacher. As an
expert, the witness may explain both personal observations and
the observations of others.20 At common law, "expert testimony
could be introduced only if its subject matter was beyond common
knowledge and experience" and, therefore, by definition beyond
the trier of fact's capacity to understand.21 In other words, the
subject matter of the expert testimony was required to be "beyond
... lay comprehension" before an expert could testify.22 The
expert brought to the trial the special skills, experience, or scientific
knowledge necessary to understand the issues.23 Within the evolu-
tion of common law regarding expert opinions, a body of rules
developed-involving techniques and skills necessary for the intro-
duction of expert testimony-that almost equalled the complexity
of the subject matter about which the expert testimony was given.24
At common law, the intricacy of the hearsay rules had nothing
on the complicated rules for qualifying an expert witness and for
eliciting the expert's testimony.
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
The promulgation of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 codified the
then-existing federal case law to the effect that expert witness
testimony was not needed unless the issue to which the testimony
would be directed was "not within the common knowledge of the
18. [d.
19. [d. at 470-71.
20. [d. at 471.
21. Debra T. Landis, Annotation, When Will Expert Testimony "Assist Trier ofFact"
so as to Be Admissible at Federal Trial Under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence, 75
A.L.R. FED. 461, 467 (1985).
22. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
MANuAL 631 (4th ed. 1986).
23. Ladd, supra note 8, at 417.
24. [d.
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average layman."25 Additionally, Rule 702 allows expert testimony
if it will aid the trier of fact. Therefore, the Rule modifies the
common law by specifically providing that an expert may be
employed merely because his testimony could be helpful to the
trier of fact in understanding evidence that is simply difficult but
not necessarily beyond ordinary understanding.26 Thus, Rule 702
establishes a more lax standard and a lower foundational threshold
than did the common law.
Overall, the Federal Rules of Evidence codified most of the
common law exceptions to the opinion rule.27 The Federal Rules
operate aggregately to allow the admission of a larger amount of
opinion evidence than would have been admissible under common
law; however, the federal provisions retain the traditional safe-
guards to prevent undue prejudice.28 The Rules provide a self-
contained analytical approach to the determination of admissibility
requiring that opinion evidence be received only from a witness
who is knowledgeable, and that the evidence be of assistance to
the trier of fact.29 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides: "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise.' '30
Rule 702 allows a qualified expert to give both factual and
opinion testimony only if the testimony will help the trier of fact
understand the issues at bar.J1 The Rule "provides a broadly stated
standard for the use of expert testimony."32 In Salem v. United
States Lines Corp., the Supreme Court noted that "the trial judge
25. Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966). Rule 702 is a codification
of existing federal law. 3 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 1702[01], at 702-7 (citing New York Trial Lawyers, Committee on the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, Recommendation and Study 200 (1970».
Traditionally, parties have relied on expert witness opinions to establish specialized or
technical facts too complex for the lay witness to explain; and this allowed an exception
to the general ban against opinion evidence. Herman E. Garner, Jr., Opinion and Expert
Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 36 LA. L. REv. 123, 127 (1975).
26. Garner, supra note 25, at 127-28.
27. [d. at 123.
28. [d. The court may always hold evidence inadmissible if its introduction would
cause undue prejudice. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
29. Garner, supra note 25, at 123.
30. FED. R. EVID. 702.
31. Garner, supra note 25, at 128.
32. Keith S. Kucera-Bozarth, Note, The State of the Law as Evidence for the Jury,
46 Mo. L. REv. 255, 257-58 (1981).
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has broad discretion in the matter of the admission or exclusion
of expert evidence, and his action is to be sustained unless mani-
festly erroneous. "33 The broad standard established by Rule 702,
together with a deferential standard of appellate review, guarantees
the trial court a great amount of discretion in the use of expert
testimony.34
Rule 702 still approximates the common-law rule.3s The Rule
702 Advisory Committee's note states that "an intelligent evalua-
tion of facts is often difficult or impossible without the application
of some scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. The
most common source of this knowledge is the testimony of an
expert witness."36 Like the common law, Rule 702 views expert
witnesses as professional explainersY In essence, an expert witness
may be employed if the specialized knowledge of the witness can
be expected to be helpful in deciding a case correctly.38 Rule 702
authorizes expert witness usage whenever the expert will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue.39
C. Expert Testimony in the Modern Adversarial System
Today, expert testimony is used to accomplish a variety of
tasks.40 "It is used to demonstrate facts that could not be dem-
33. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962). The rule gives the judge
"considerable discretion in regulating the use of experts as well as in limiting the subject
matter of their testimony." Kucera-Bozarth, supra note 32, at 258; see also 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 4, § 487, at 644. Both the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have held
that they are reluctant to reverse a trial court's decision to allow or to prohibit expert
testimony. Salem, 370 U.S. at 35; see also Nielson v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 F.2d
272, 276-77 (8th Cir. 1978); Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1374 (8th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048, 1053 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1100 (1977); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973).
34. Kucera-Bozarth, supra note 32, at 258.
35. See McElhaney, supra note 17, at 463. It is stated that a "casual reading of the
Federal Rules of Evidence gives the impression that not much of the familiar practice
concerning expert witnesses has been changed. That impression is [misleading]." Id. The
rules are actually a set of additions and modifications to the common law and only make
sense when considered in that context. Id. The difference between the common law approach
and what is possible under the Federal Rules of Evidence often is dramatic. Id. at 477.
36. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 25, at 702-2.
37. McElhaney, supra note 17, at 479.
38. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 22, at 631.
39. Garner, supra note 25, at 127-28.
40. Donald J. Zoeller & Thomas P. Lynch, Expert Testimony Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence-Introduction and Overview, 2 LEGAL NOTES & VIEWPOINTS Q. 31, 31 (May
1982). See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REvENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURT-
ROOM (1991) (author conducts a wholesale critique on the abuses of science by ersatz expert
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onstrated to a factfinder without some special skill or discipline. "41
It is also used to prove facts that cannot be proven otherwise
through lay testimony.42 Additionally, expert testimony is used to
explain nuances and to draw conclusions and inferences from a
given set of facts which, again, may only be accomplished through
the application of some special knowledge or skill.43 For any use,
the basic requirement is that the expert testimony be helpful to
the factfinder. 44 An additional restriction is that the expert must
not usurp the role of the factfinder or the judge.4s A final principle
underlying the role of expert testimony is the concept of reasonable
reliance, that is, reliance on the expert for testimony must make
good sense.46 The expert may not be used to admit testimony that
would otherwise be inadmissible.47 The Federal Rules of Evidence
regarding expert testimony incorporate these principles, which were
well-established in the common law.48 "The test expressed in Rule
witnesses and the lawyers and courts who rely on "junk science"); USING EXPERTS IN CIvIL
CASES (Melvin D. Kraft ed., 2d ed. 1982) (book has sections on different areas of conflict
where experts are frequently and beneficially used, plus general observations on the use of
experts). The Federal Judicial Center currently is conducting a full-scale study of the use
of expert witnesses at civil trials. This effort promises to provide empirical data on the
frequency and nature of expert testimony. Letter from William B. Eldridge, Director
Research Division, Federal Judicial Center to Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chair, Com-
mittee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States
(July 11, 1991) (on file with the Kansas Law Review).




45. Id. at 32. Presumably, testimony that otherwise satisfies the applicable Federal
Rules of Evidence, by definition, will not be deemed usurpatious and will be admitted. In
this way, this is more of a conclusion than a factor in the analysis.
46. Id. "[T]he concept of reasonable reliance ... takes into consideration two issues:
(1) is the material relied upon by the expert the type of material that experts in his [or
her] field normally rely upon in their work and (2) is the material trustworthy?" Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. In August 1991, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure released
proposed amendments to Rule 702 for public comment. The Committee notes to the
proposed amendments reinforce the general thesis of this Article:
This revision is intended to limit the use, but increase the utility and reliability,
of party-initiated opinion testimony bearing on scientific and technical issues.
The use of such testimony has greatly increased since enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. This result was intended by the drafters of the rule, who
were responding to concerns that the restraints previously imposed on expert
testimony were artificial and an impediment to the illumination of technical issues
in dispute. See, e.g., McCormick on Evidence, § 203 (3d ed., 1984). While much
expert testimony now presented is illuminating and useful, much is not. Virtually
all is expensive, if not to the proponent then to adversaries. Particularly in civil
litigation with high financial stakes, large expenditures for marginally useful
HeinOnline -- 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 332 1991-1992
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702-will the expert testimony 'assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue'-emerges as the
central concern" and the controlling question.49
The raison d'etre for expert testimony is that the expert must
supply something that nonexperts cannot or are not qualified to
provide.50 Another important distinction between expert and non-
expert witnesses is that the expert may respond to hypothetical
questions while the nonexpert may not.51 Therefore, an expert
witness may testify not only from facts perceived personally by
the expert outside of the trial, but also from facts made known
to the expert at or before the trial.52 Additionally, the expert may
testify based on personal background knowledge unrelated to the
events of the trial.53
Two elements are required to warrant the use of expert testi-
mony.54 First, "the subject of inference must be so distinctively
related to some science, profession, business or occupation as to
expert testimony has become commonplace. Procurement of expert testimony is
occasionally used as a trial technique to wear down adversaries. In short, while
testimony from experts may be desirable if not crucial in many cases, excesses
cannot be doubted and should be curtailed.
While concern for the quality and even integrity of hired testimony is not new,
Winans v. New York & Erie R.R., 62 U.S. 88, 101 (1858); Hand, Historical and
Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1901),
the hazards to the judicial process have increased as more technical evidence is
presented:
When the evidence relates to highly technical matters and each side has
shopped for experts favorable to its position, it is naive to expect the jury to
be capable of assessing the validity of dramatical1y opposed testimony.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, § 706[01] at
706-07 (1985).
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53. 156-57 (1991)
(committee notes).
One aspect of this revision is to dispel any doubts that the court. acting under Rule
104(a), has the power and responsibility to decide whether and' on what subjects expert
testimony should be permitted in a case and whether the particular witness proffered as an
expert has the necessary expertise to provide such testimony. See id. at 157.
49. 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 25, 1 702[01], at 702-7; see also Edward J.
Imwinkelried, The "Bases" of Expert Testimony: The Syllogistic Structure of Scientific
Testimony, 67 N.C. L. REv. I, 5 (1988).
50. Zoeller & Lynch, supra note 40, at 34.
51. FED. R. EVID. 703 and advisory committee's note; Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball Int'l,
Inc., 620 F.2d 399, 404 (3d Cir. 1980).
52. FED. R. EVID. 703 and advisory committee's note; Teen-Ed, 620 F.2d at 404. The
expert may therefore sit in the trial and testify upon the evidence presented. Courts can
allow the expert to remain in the courtroom under an exception to the exclusion of witnesses
rule. The expert is viewed, in effect, as a party who needs to be present to assist counsel
at the trial. See FED. R. EVID. 615(3).
53. SALTZBURG & REDDEN. supra note 22, at 631-32.
54. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 13. at 33.
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be beyond the ken of laymen."ss Furthermore, the admission of
expert opinion must assist the trier of fact. The Rule permits the
admissibility of expert opinions even when the matter is within the
competence of jurors, if the specialized knowledge is helpful to
the jurors in their determination of the issues.S6 Therefore, the
second requirement for the admission of expert testimony is that
the expert witness "must have sufficient skill, knowledge, or
experience in or related to the pertinent field or calling" that the
expert's opinion or inference might be expected to aid the trier of
fact. S7 Basically, this means that the witness must be qualified.
Once a witness is qualified as an expert, any alleged shortcomings
in the person's qualifications are matters of weight and not cred-
ibility.
If these two requirements are satisfied, then the money a party
pays to the witness is called a "fee" rather than a "bribe." These
two requirements, helpfulness to the trier of fact and specialized
knowledge, will be elaborated separately.
1. Assistance to the Trier of Fact
The general test for use in determining whether expert testimony
is helpful to the trier of fact has been described as: "a 'common
sense inquiry [as to] whether the untrained layman would be
qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree
the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a
specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dis-
pute.' "S8
Essentially, the helpfulness analysis is an ad hoc determination
and "[w]hether, in any given case, the expert testimony is necessary
to aid the jury in its search for the truth depends upon such a
variety of factors readily apparent only to the trial judge that [an
appellate court] must depend heavily upon his [or her] judgment."s9
Factors the trial judge ought to consider in deciding whether the
expert testimony is helpful to the jury include: 1) whether the
opinion offered is the proper subject for expert testimony; 2)
55. [d.
56. [d.; see also 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 25, 1 702[02], at 702-15 to -16.
57. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 13, at 33. In Paris Adult Theatre v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973), the Court stated that expert testimony is generally
admitted to explain what the jurors would otherwise not understand. The requirements for
the admission of expert testimony are that: 1) the testimony must assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence, and 2) the witness must be qualified as an expert. FED. R.
EVID. 702; see also ROBERT E. KEEToN, JUDGINO 243-44 (1990) (describing methods available
for a judge to determine if an expert witness is qualified to testify).
58. David J. Gibbons, Rules 701-706: Opinions and Expert Testimony, 57 CHI. BAR
REc. 224, 225 (1976) (citing FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note).
59. Krizak v. W.C. Brooks & Sons, Inc., 320 F.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1963).
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whether the testimony is likely to mislead or confuse the jury; 3)
whether the testimony is mere conjecture; 4) whether the testimony
involves matters within the scope of ordinary experience; and 5)
whether the witness is acting as a summary witness as opposed to
an expert witness.60 In addition to these factors, and included
implicitly, is that each aspect of an expert witness's testimony
must also meet the requirement of Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Rule 403 provides that evidence is inadmissible, despite its rele-
vance, if it is prejudicial, confusing, misleading, or wastes time.61
A rule of thumb often used to determine whether expert testimony
will assist the trier of fact is whether the untrained layman would
be capable of determining the issue intelligently without expert
testimony.62 No more specific rule has been formulated; therefore,
the analysis is based upon the particular circumstances of each
case.63 Thus, "in deciding whether expert opinion testimony will
be helpful to the trier of fact, the trial judge must determine
whether the issue in question is capable of adequate illumination
by factual testimony."64
2. Expert Qualification
An expert must be qualified in the subject area of the offered
testimony. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon
under Rule 702 are not limited to scientific and technical knowl-
edge, but extend to all specialized knowledge.65 Also within the
60. Zoeller & Lynch, supra note 40, at 34. Case law has elaborated on the criteria to
examine the admissibility of expert testimony: 1) whether the subject matter is one for
which the expert testimony is appropriate; 2) whether the probative value of the evidence
is greater than its prejudicial effects; and 3) whether the witness is qualified to testify on
the subject matter. E.g., United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1973).
61. FED. R. EVID. 403.
62. Landis, supra note 21, at 468; see Haniling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-05
(1974); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 278-79 (3d Cir. 1983);
Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152-53; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F.
Supp. 1313, 1334 (B.D. Pa. 1980); Gibbons, supra note 58, at 225; William B. Stoebuck,
Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends and a Note of Caution, 41 DENV. L. CENTER
J. 226, 234 (1964); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
63. See Landis, supra note 21, at 468.
64. Garner, supra note 25, at 128. Logically, expert opinion testimony on an issue is
not more assistance to the trier of fact than factual testimony on the issue. Id. at 128-29.
Usually, the subjects which require expert aid in order to assist the trier of fact are those
involving technical subjects for which some expertise is necessary to understand the evidence.
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 13, at 33.
65. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, § 13, at 33-34; see LaCombe v. A-T-O, Inc., 679 F.2d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1982).
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scope of the Rule are witnesses skilled by their experience, such
as bankers and landowners.66 Rule 702 is thus broadly phrased to
include any identifiable field of specialized knowledge that may be
used to assist the trier of fact.67 The requisite knowledge may be
from reading alone, practice alone, or a combination of both.68
As the Rule 702 Advisory Committee's note states, a broad stan-
dard for testing the qualifications of an expert is recognized under
the Federal Rules.69 The Committee explicitly noted that an expert's
knowledge may be gained by experience and training as well as by
formal education.70
II. THE INADMISSmILITY OF EXPERT LEGAL TESTIMONY IN
THEORY
A. Expert Legal Testimony Defined
We may borrow a definition from an enthusiast: "Expert tes-
timony on the law consists of an opinion on the state of domestic
law, which includes federal law, the law of the jurisdiction in
which the court sits, and the law of sister jurisdictions."71 Expert
testimony on the law may concern "the relative certainty or
uncertainty of the law, what the law is, what it means, or any
combination of these."72
66. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note; LaCombe, 679 F.2d at 434 (land-
owner automatically qualified to give testimony regarding opinion on value of property).
67. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 13, at 34 & n.10. "The rule is
broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon are not limited merely
to the 'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all 'specialized' knowledge. Similarly, the
expert is viewed ••• [as an expert even when] testifying to land values." FED. R. EVID.
702 advisory committee's note.
68. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 13, at 34.
69. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
70. ld. See generally Garner, supra note 25, at 129. It has been noted that "anyone
who has skill, experience or training may qualify as an expert witness." Gibbons, supra
note 58, at 224. For example, a user and seller of drugs was considered an "experienced"
person in the sense of Rule 702 and was therefore qualified to give an expert opinion as
to whether a certain substance was heroin. United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 313-14
(8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977).
Furthermore, there is a critical distinction between the role of advocate and witness. See
Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. American Gym, Recreational & Athletic Equip. Corp., 546
F.2d 530, 538 (3d Cir. 1976); see also MODEL RULES OP PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7
(prohibits a lawyer from acting as an advocate in a lawsuit where he is also a witness).
71. Steven I. Friedland, Expert Testimony on the Law: Excludable or Justifiable?, 37
U. MIAMI L. REv. 451, 453 (1983). The author recognizes that expert testimony is permissible
regarding the law of foreign jurisdictions. ld. at 456-57. It is unclear if this is what he
means in his definition which includes "the law of sister jurisdictions." ld. at 453.
72. ld. However expert legal testimony is defined, even enthusiasts admit that federal
courts generally hold that such testimony is inadmissible. See id. at 451-52.
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B. The Context of Judge and Jury
As has been explained, Rule 702 provides a broad standard for
the use of expert testimony. The essential criterion used to deter-
mine whether expert testimony is appropriate is whether the in-
formation "will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue."73 This criterion necessarily gives
the trial judge considerable discretion in regulating the use of
experts as well as in limiting the subject matter of their testimony.
However, expert testimony should not usurp the role of the judge
or the jury. It has been said that "[in] any jury trial, the court
answers questions of law and the jury answers questions of fact.' '74
"This simple statement summarizes one of the cornerstones of the
American legal system."75 The simplicity of this statement tends
to mask the complexity underlying the application of the subtle
concept of separation of function.76
As explained by one commentator:
It is not the jury's function to determine the law; the jury thus has no
need to hear conflicting testimony on the proper interpretation of the
law. In fact, such conflicting legal testimony could be harmful . . .
[c]onflicting expert legal testimony or any legal testimony [which is] not
in conformity with the judge's formulation of the law fails to meet the
helpfulness standard and should be excluded.77
Commentators have stated that the line distinguishing the proper
from the improper use of expert testimony should be the same
line as that separating questions properly decided by the jury from
those properly decided by the court: "The court decides the
underlying legal issue. It is then left to the jury to determine the
factual question . . . ."78 Both judge and jury must be aware of
this distinction if the system is to work as it is designed. Each
must perform its assigned role throughout trial, not just at the
formal jury charge.
73. FED. R. EVID. 702.
74. John W. Schaefer, Note, United States v. Garber: The Propriety of Expert Legal
Testimony, 26 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 447, 447 (1982); cf. Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111
S. Ct. 1217, 1221-22 (1991) (court of appeals must review de novo district court's deter-
mination of questions of state law).
75. Schaefer, supra note 74, at 447.
76. Id. See generally Symposium, The Role of the Jury in Civil Dispute Resolution,
1990 CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
77. Note, Expert Legal Testimony, 97 HARv. L. REv. 797, 811 (1984) (emphasis in
original).
78. Charles M. Leibson, Legal Malpractice Cases: Special Problems in Identifying
Issues of Law and Fact and in the Use of Expert Testimony, 75 Ky. L.J. 1, 19 (1986)
(citing H. Paul Breslin & Joseph P. McMonigle, The Use of Expert Testimony in Actions
Against Attorneys, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 119, 123-24 (1980».
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Therefore, the conclusion cannot be escaped that expert legal
testimony on the law is inadmissible under both Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 702. Rule 702 initially allows only expert testi-
mony that is of assistance to the trier of. fact. If the testimony by
the expert is to instruct the jury on the proper legal issues, the
testimony usurps the role of the judge. The judge is the proper
party to provide instruction on the law to the jury; and because
the jury is instructed to apply the law as set forth by the judge,
the testimony by an expert upon the law by definition cannot be
of any assistance to the jury. If the expert's testimony conflicts
with that of the judge, the testimony may actually make the jury's
determination more difficult. This effect would be diametrically
opposed to the essential function of expert testimony as contem-
plated in Rule 702.
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that relevant evidence is
inadmissible if it confuses, misleads, or wastes the jury's time.
Clearly, expert legal testimony may result in all three problems.
If the expert testifies on the law and the testimony is not consistent
with the judge's instructions, then the expert's testimony acts
simply to confuse and mislead the jury. Furthermore, because the
job of instructing the jury on the law belongs to the judge, even
expert legal testimony that coincides with the judge's instruction
serves merely to waste the time of the court and jury and, therefore,
should be excluded. Furthermore, there are the additional back-
ground concerns that reliance on expert witnesses can exacerbate
resource inequalities that might exist between parties or can result
in a confusing "battle of experts" when the litigants are evenly
matched financially.
An admitted difficulty in this analysis is distinguishing between
questions of law and questions of fact. Over time, common-law
jurisdictions have redrawn the fine lines separating legal questions
from factual questions.79 This has had much to do with the historic
conflict between judge and jury over trial power. The modern
trend towards the expanded use of expert testimony brings this
contest into the spotlight once again. The "increasing complexity
79. Schaefer, supra note 74, at 447. Furthermore, mixed questions of fact and law
require even greater sophistication and discernment. The determination of what is a question
of fact for the jury and what is a question of law for the judge, however, goes beyond
the scope of this Article. See generally Morris S. Arnold, Law and Fact in the Medieval
Jury Trial: Out of Sight, Out ofMind, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267 (1974); Clarence Morris,
Law and Fact, 55 HARv. L. REv. 1303 (1942); see also Linda L. Addison, Rule 704 and
the Law: Not a Matter ofOpinion, 50 TEx. B.J. 383 (1987) (the approach taken is borrowed
from reported decisions which, for the most part, take for granted that a particular issue
is one of law and then apply the circuit precedent regarding expert legal testimony).
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of the facts in modern cases and the advances in the sophistication
of various disciplines place determinations of [many] factual ques-
tions beyond the common knowledge of the jury."80 However
complex these questions and distinguishing factors have become,
clearly the Federal Rules of Evidence only permit expert testimony
on issues of fact and not on issues of law.
C. Rule 702 Does Not Permit Expert Testimony on the Law
While Federal Rule of Evidence 702 allows testimony by experts,
it allows such testimony only "[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. "81 The explicit language
of Rule 702 does not contemplate the admissibility of expert
testimony for any purpose other than to aid in the understanding
of evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Clearly, these specifi-
cally stated purposes are not broad enough to include expert
assistance on legal questions. This should end the inquiry, under
the plain-meaning standard of interpretating the Rule without
regard to legislative history, policy, or practical considerations.82
These other considerations, nonetheless, substantiate the same con-
clusion.
The Advisory Committee's commentary to Rule 702 neither
mentions nor provides for the use of expert testimony as assistance
to the jury on questions of law.83 The commentary begins by
stating that "[a]n intelligent evaluation of facts is often difficult
. . . without specialized knowledge."84 The commentary repeats
the familiar test that expert testimony must be likely to assist the
trier of fact to be admissible.85 This test may be applied only if
the expert testimony is being offered initially for a permissible
purpose under the Rule.86 This broad test cannot allow a party to
avoid the specific limitations placed upon expert testimony set out
explicitly in the text of the Rule itself. Additionally, the commen-
80. Schaefer, supra note 74, at 447.
81. FED. R. Evm. 702 (emphasis added).
82. The Supreme Court has imposed a plain-meaning standard of interpretation on
the Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., United States v. ZoIin, 491 U.S. 554, 566 (1989);
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1988). See generally Randolph N. Jonakait,
The Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEx. L. REv.
745 (1990).
83. FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note.
84. ld. (emphasis added).
85. ld.
86. ld.
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tary states that the Rule is broadly phrased.87 As addressed by the
commentary, this breadth has nothing to do with the subject matter
required for the expert testimony to be admissible, but rather
involves the qualifications which are necessary for an expert in the
subject matter of the testimony.88 Once a witness is qualified as
an expert, any alleged shortcomings in the person's qualifications
are matters of weight and not admissibility.
Furthermore, the general intent and scope of Rule 702 do not
permit testimony by experts on the law. Rule 702 was a codification
of existing common law. The Rule was intended to permit a
relaxation of the admissibility of opinion evidence while maintain-
ing the imposition of reasonable restrictions on the use of such
opinion testimony. Testimony by an expert on issues of law is
beyond the scope of the Rule. Even before the codification of
these common-law rules into the Federal Rules of Evidence, scho-
lars noted that witnesses should not be permitted to provide
evidence regarding legal questions. One commentator noted:
A witness cannot be allowed to give an opinion on a question of
law . . . . In order to justify having courts resolve disputes between
litigants, it must be posited as an a priori assumption that there is one,
but only one, legal answer .... There being only one applicable legal
rule for each dispute or issue, it requires only one spokesman of the
law, who ... is the judge ....89
In addition, the use of expert testimony to admit conclusions of
law is disfavored as shown by the Rule 704 Advisory Committee's
note. Rule 704 permits witnesses to give their opinions on ultimate
issues of fact.90 The Committee stated, however, that the rules
"stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately
explored legal criteria. "91 This related commentary makes it clear
that testimony on ultimate issues of law is not favored.92 The
functional basis for this important distinction between allowing
expert testimony on ultimate issues of fact but not allowing testi-
mony on issues of law is that testimony on legal issues "circum-
vents the jury's decision-making function by telling it how to
decide the case."93
87. [d.
88. [d. The broadly phrased discussion addresses potential experts' fields and sources
of knowledge.
89. Stoebuck, supra note 62, at 237.
90. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
91. [d. See generally Maury R. Olicker, Comment, The Admissibility ofExpert Witness
Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. M1AMI L. REv. 831 (1988).
92. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir. 1988), eert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008
(1989).
93. [d.; see also Addison, supra note 79, at 383.
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D. The Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not permit expert
testimony regarding legal issues except under proscribed circum-
stances.94 When determining issues of foreign law, an expert witness
properly may assist the judge in finding the law of another country.
Various rules so provide, but the authorization of such testimony
is explicitly limited. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.1 only
provides that: "The court, in determining foreign law, may con-
sider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether
or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. "95
The Advisory Committee's note states that "the rule frees the
court from the restraints of the ordinary rules of evidence."96 The
freedom which allows expert testimony regarding foreign law is
"made necessary by the peculiar nature of the issue of foreign
law."97 Furthermore, the Rule sets up procedural requirements that
provide for prior notification to opposing counsel and the court
of the intent to rely upon evidence regarding issues of foreign
law.98 Cases applying this Rule interpret foreign law to be the law
of countries other than the United States.99 The stated purpose of
Rule 26.1, which specifically addresses the admissibility of expert
testimony on foreign legal issues, is to remove the restrictions on
this type of evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. This
further supports the conclusion that the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not allow expert evidence on domestic legal issues.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make the same distinc-
tion. lOo Rule 44.1 addresses the admissibility of evidence to aid in
the determination of foreign law in civil trialS. IOI It provides that
in determining foreign law, a court may consider "any relevant
material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted
94. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 26 (Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal criminal
proceedings).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1 (emphasis added).
96. ld. advisory committee's note.
97. ld. At least in part, the functional rationale for this exception is that foreign legal
materials are generally less available. By the logical default, courts would have to rely on
expert legal testimony on issues of domestic law, if cases and statutes and secondary
materials were not otherwise available to the court and the litigants. But, of course, they
are in fact readily available to all concerned.
98. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1.
99. See, e.g., United States v. Atwell, 71 F.R.D. 357, 361 (D. Del. 1976).
100. See FED. R. Crv. P. 43 (Federal Rules of Evidence apply in federal civil pro-
ceedings).
101. FED. R. Cry. P. 44.1.
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by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence."102
The Rules of Civil Procedure, like the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
provide a procedural requirement of prior notification when one
intends to present evidence on an issue concerning the law of a
foreign country.103
The Advisory Committee's note states that the purpose under-
lying Rule 44.1 is to avoid restrictions imposed by the Federal
Rules of Evidence which otherwise would prevent examination of
material that could aid in the determination of foreign law issues.104
The rationale underlying the Rule is that the court, not the jury,
should determine issues of foreign law. lOS The Rule thus allows
the court access to any information relevant to its decision. loo
Finally, it is noteworthy that under both Federal Rule of Crim-
inal Procedure 26.1 and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 44.1, a
decision on a foreign law issue is considered a determination of
law, not a question of fact, and therefore is consistent with the
general concept that the court determines issues of law and the
jury determines issues of fact. loo
E. Legal Malpractice Actions
Testimony about law may represent evidence of a factual stan-
dard in one kind of case. For example, expert testimony by an
attorney is properly admissible in lawsuits involving legal malprac-
tice. lOs "It is now generally accepted that expert testimony is
102. [d. Rule 44.1 thus is similar to Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1.
104. [d. advisory committee's note.
IDS. See id.
106. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1; FED. R. CIuM. P. 26.1. See generally Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for
a Die-Hard Doctrine, 6S MICH. L. REv. 613 (1967); Jerome J. Krasa, Note, Judicial Notice
of Foreign Law, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1962 (196S).
107. See, e.g., Kalmich v. Bruno, SS3 F.2d S49, SS2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977); accord, FED. R. CIV. P. 44.1 advisory committee's note; cf. Salve Regina
College v. Russell, III S. Ct. 1217, 1221-2S (1991) (a court of appeals should review de
novo a district court's determination of questions of state law).
108. There are four evidentiary problems inherent in legal malpractice cases which are
recogniud by commentators. These are:
1) which issues should the court decide and which issues should the jury decide?
2) which issues should be addressed by expert testimony and which should not?
3) how should jury instructions be framed to leave factual questions to the jury
and legal questions to the court? 4) upon appeal, which issues should be reviewed
as factual determinations and which as legal determinations?
Leibson, supra note 78, at 2.
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admissible in actions against attorneys."I09 Most courts hold that
the plaintiff in such an action must present expert testimony in
order to prove a prima facie case of legal malpractice.110 In some
cases, however, the expert testimony is not permitted because the
action of the defendant-attorney is within the layman's common
experience.III In legal malpractice actions, expert legal testimony
is often necessary to establish the proper standard of care, a
standard which is factual. ll2 Because attorneys are required to
exercise the skill and knowledge ordinarily possessed by attorneys
under similar circumstances, an attorney is generally the only
witness who will be qualified as an expert to establish the requisite
standard of care. ll3
Although expert legal testimony is proper in this circumstance,
commentators agree that the expert should not be able to usurp
the judge's function of deciding issues of law which are "not the
proper subject of expert testimony."114 The existence of a duty on
the part of the defendant-attorney is a question of law for the
court. "It is black letter law that expert testimony is not permissible
on issues of law."l15 The question whether there was a breach of
109. H. Paul Breslin & Joseph P. McMonigle, The Use ofExpert Testimony in Actions
Against Attorneys, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 119, 119 (1980). See Ronald E. Mallen & Victor B.
Levit, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 665 n.51 (2d ed. 1981) for cases on legal malpractice which
note that expert testimony was deemed admissible.
110. Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 109, at 121.
111. There are five recognized exceptions to the requirement of expert evidence in a
legal malpractice case. These are: 1) the action by the defendant-attorney is within common
experience; 2) the action is based upon the legal theory of res ipsa loquitur; 3) the expert
legal testimony is obtained from the testimony of the defendant-attorney; 4) under FED.
R. EVID. 803(18), the expert evidence is obtained from entering a learned treatise into
evidence; and 5) the trial is a bench trial. ld. at 121-23.
112. See id. at 120.
113. ld. In Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 85, 93 (S.D. Iowa 1982),
aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983), an attorney, qualified as an expert in trademark and
patent law, testified regarding the proper conduct of a reasonably prudent attorney practicing
in the field of unfair competition.
In a legal malpractice case, it may be an issue whether a lawyer had a reasonable belief
about the law. The lawyer's advice, for example, may have been based on a conclusion
that a certain body of law was uncertain, and the issue is whether that conclusion and the
advice based on it were competent. Expert testimony by a lawyer on this issue presumably
would be admissible under Rule 702.
114. Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 109, at 123. In other words, the court decides
the underlying legal issue of whether the attorney committed an error of law. See Leibson,
supra note 78, at 19. It is left to the jury to detennine the factual question of whether
other attorneys similarly situated would have made the same legal error. See id.; see also
Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Premise Facts,
73 MINN. L. REv. 1, 51-54, 67-69 (1988) ("Trial rules and practices should prohibit experts
from giving legal opinions.").
115. Note, supra note 77, at 797.
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that duty, however, is a mixed question- of fact and law with
responsibilities falling on both the court and the jury to determine
the issue.
When the proffered opinion relates to a claimed departure from
a standard of practice, the opinion testimony is often affected by
the underlying view of the applicable law. In such cases, the
prudent course may be to ask the expert witness, outside the
presence of the jury, to state precisely for the court the legal rules
that are the premise for the witness's opinion. The judge can then
determine whether the expert's legal premises are wholly compatible
with the instructions on the law that the judge intends to include
in the charge to the jury. The judge should admit only that
testimony that is in ultimate harmony with the judge's own antic-
ipated instruction. This is generally the wise procedural course in
legal malpractice cases.
F. The Unhelpful Distinction Between Bench and Jury Trials
Some commentators have argued that although the fundamental
criterion of the admissibility of expert testimony is helpfulness,
expert legal testimony may aid both the court as well as the jury.116
In both bench and jury trials, the judge must determine the
applicable law and its proper interpretation.1I7 The obvious argu-
ment against the admission of expert legal testimony-besides the
twin concerns for confusion of the jury and usurpation of the
judge's function-is that the judge is assumed to be an expert in
domestic law and, therefore, has no practical need for another
expert's assistance. liS Although this assumption may sometimes be
true, many commentators suggest that this presupposition has
become something of an exaggeration due to the increased com-
plexity of cases.119 It is difficult for judges to keep abreast of
116. Jd. at 804-05.
117. Jd. The Advisory Committee's note to Rule 201{a) endorsed this procedure:
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domestic law, the judge
is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject the propositions
of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data
to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make an independent
search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or what the parties
present. . . . IT)he parties do no more than to assist; they control no part of the
process.
FED. R. EVID. 201{a) advisory committee's note (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial
Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1944»; see also FED. R. EVID. 611 (giving a judge
reasonable control over the mode and presentation of evidence).
118. Note, supra note 77, at 804. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 1952.
119. Note, supra note 77, at 804 (citing Breslin & McMonigle, supra note 109, at 123).
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complex areas of law, however, the judge has various opportunities
to gain the necessary expertise without admitting expert legal
testimony before the jury.120
A judge needing an update regarding the domestic law applicable
to a case has several methods by which to obtain the requisite
legal knowledge. The judge has judicial clerks whose duties include
legal research and analysis; additionally, the judge may request
briefs from counsel regarding the applicable law. 121
Some commentators urge that in a bench trial, the judge should
allow the parties to present conflicting expert legal testimony
whenever the judge is persuaded that the testimony likely will be
of assistance. l22 By the same token, the judge also could allow
such testimony even in a jury trial by the simple expedient of
requiring the experts to testify outside of the jury's presence. 123
Furthermore, under Federal Rule of Evidence 706, the judge is
authorized to appoint court expert witnesses rather than allowing
the parties to present their own hired experts. 124 By hearing expert
legal testimony outside the presence of the jury, the judge arguably
avoids the problems regarding jury confusion and usurping the
judge's role. The judge still makes the final decision regarding the
applicable law. 12S Or so the argument goes.
The most succinct, though perhaps not the most erudite, coun-
terargument is to ask, "What is the point of this?" The advocates
120. [d. at 804. Continuing education for judges loday is something of a growth
industry, with the Federal Judicial Center leading the way.
121. Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1944).
122. Note, supra note 77, at 805.
123. [d. It should be noted that by allowing briefs by counsel and expert testimony on
legal questions, the cost of obtaining knowledge on the law is shifted to the litigants.
124. FED. R. EVID. 706. There are, of course, ethical restraints beyond the rules of
evidence. For example, "ex parte communications, or ... other communications made to
the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding
are prohibited." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3B(7) (1990). The Model
Code goes on to approve of the ethics of appointing an expert witness on the law: "[a]
judge may obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding
before the judge if the judge gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable opportunity to respond." [d.
Canon 3B(7)(b). The commentary makes clear that ethical restraints prohibit "communi-
cations from lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the
proceeding, except to the limited extent permitted." [d. The commentary goes on to
impliedly suggest, however, that expert legal testimony from the witness stand is not
appropriate or desirable, even as an ethical matter. However, "[a]n appropriate and often
desirable pr.ocedure for a court to obtain the advice of a disinterested expert on legal issues
is to invite the expert to file a brief amicus curiae." [d. The argument in this Article is
not that the challenged practice is somehow unethical, but that it is not appropriate as a
matter of the law of evidence.
125. Note, supra note 77, at 810.
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at trial have available to them all the traditional modes of pre-
senting the law to the court-briefs, memoranda, and argument-
apart from the potentially confusing, even redundant, mode of
calling an expert witness on the law.
III. SOME CONFUSION IN THE CASE LAW
An analysis of the modern use of expert legal testimony would
not be complete without an appraisal of the case law. Many
decisions hold that expert testimony on the law is generally inad-
missible. This line of cases will be summarized first. Next, decisions
which have admitted expert legal testimony will be sampled and
critiqued. An analysis of United States v. Garberl26-the leading
decision to permit expert legal testimony-and the cases rejecting
or limiting application of this precedent will follow. The weight
of appellate precedent is against the use of expert legal testimony,
although there are reported opinions that seem to approve of it.
That these inconsistent holdings coexist in the reports may explain
district court rulings-which are not wholly unprecedented but are
certainly anomalous-admitting such testimony.
A. Decisions Not Allowing Expert Legal Testimony
What might be called the "majority rule" is that expert testi-
mony on the law is not admissible in federal court. Several leading
decisions illustrate this rule.
In 1987, the Second Circuit decided F.H. Krear & Co. v.
Nineteen Named Trustees. 127 Krear involved a conflict over the
control of employee benefit plan funds. l28 The plaintiff contracted
with the trustees to provide administrative services for the fund
and sued for payment under the contract. 129 The trustees proffered
a lawyer as a witness to testify that the contract between the parties
was unenforceable because essential terms were missing from the
document. 13O The court of appeals upheld the district court's ex-
clusion of the proffered expert testimony, and concluded that "[i]t
is not for witnesses to instruct the jury as to the applicable
principles of law, but for the judge."131
126. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979); see infra part III.C.
127. 810 F.2d 1250 (2d Cir. 1987).
128. [d. at 1255.
129. [d.
130. [d. at 1256.
131. [d. at 1258 (quoting Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509·10 (2d
Cir.). cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977».
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In deciding Krear, the court of appeals invoked an earlier
decision from the Second Circuit, Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club,
Inc.,132 which held that the trial court had erred in permitting
expert testimony regarding the parties' legal obligations. In Marx,
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant fraudulently induced the
sale of unregistered stock in the defendant corporation.133 The
district court admitted the testimony of a lawyer qualified as an
expert in securities law.134 The lawyer-witness construed the contract
between the parties and also testified that the defenses urged were
insufficient as a matter of law.135 The Second Circuit held that the
expert witness was qualified to explain the practices ordinarily
followed by lawyers and corporations in obtaining registration of
stock if the evidence was relevant to the case; however, the
testimony regarding legal standards derived from the contract was
not admissible. 136 The court of appeals added that the judge's
special legal knowledge made the lawyer's expert testimony super-
flUOUS. 137 The appellate court pointed out that the danger in
allowing this testimony is that the jury may think that the expert
knows more than the judge in a particular area of law, which is
an "inadmissible inference in our system of law."138 This was so
prejudicial as to be deemed reversible error.139
In 1986, the Fourth Circuit addressed the admissibility of expert
testimony on the law in Adalman v. Baker, Watts & CO.I40 In
Adalman, the controversy surrounded a tax-sheltered investment. 141
The tax investment was organized as a partnership, and investors
were solicited.142 Subsequently, the partnership went into receiv-
ership, and investors filed this suit alleging securities law viola-
132. 550 F.2d 505, 508 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977).
133. lei.. at 506.
134. ld. at 508-09.
135. ld. at 509.
136. ld. at 509-10.
137. ld. at 510. The court stated that "[ilt is for the jury to evaluate the facts in the
light of the applicable rules of law, and it is therefore erroneous for a witness to state his
opinion on the law of the forum." ld.
138. ld. at 512.
139. In a recent decision, United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), the
Second Circuit recognized the usefulness of expert testimony in helping the jury to
understand unfamiliar terms and concepts in the securities industry. The court cautioned,
however, that "[ilts use must be carefully circumscribed to assure that the expert does not
usurp ... the role of the judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law." ld. at
1294. Additionally, the court stated that "[als a general rule, an expert's testimony on
issues of law is inadmissible." ld.
140. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986).
141. ld. at 361-62.
142. ld.
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tions.143 The main issue of fact at trial involved the defendant's
omission from the prospectus of certain negative information. l44
The defendant proffered an expert witness to testify to his conclu-
sion that the applicable securities law did not require the disclosure
of the omitted material and the district court ruled the testimony
inadmissible.14s The court of appeals stated the issue as "to what
extent may the parties call expert witnesses . . . to testify to the
jury as to what the applicable law may mean, and what the
applicable law does or does not require?"I46 The appellate court
began its analysis by stating the general proposition that "under
our system it is the responsibility-and the duty-of the court to
state to the jury the meaning and applicability of the appropriate
law, leaving to the jury the task of determining the facts."147 The
court went on to state broadly that "[u]nder circumstances in-
volving domestic law, this court can conceive of no circumstances
which would shift this burden [of determining the applicable law]
from the court to the jury."I48 Paralleling further the Rules-based
argument made previously in this Article, the court added that
Federal Rule of Evidence 704(a) does not permit the expert witness
to "usurp the province of the judge."149
The Fifth Circuit has decided several cases regarding the admis-
sibility of expert testimony on the applicable law. The leading
decision from the Fifth Circuit is United States v. Garber. ISO
Because of the central importance of Garber and the treatment
that it has received both in later Fifth Circuit decisions and in
decisions from other circuits, it merits discussion in a separate
section of this Article. lSI Other decisions in the Fifth Circuit,
however, have addressed the issue without addressing the Garber
decision, and fit in this discussion of decisions that disapprove of
expert legal opinion.
In 1983, the Fifth Circuit decided Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.IS2
In Owen, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently in-
stalled and operated an underground gas pipeline. ls3 At trial, the
143. [d. at 362.
144. [d. at 365.
145. [d.
146. [d. at 366.
147. [d.
148. [d.
149. [d. at 368.
150. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
151. See infra part III.C.
152. 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983).
153. [d. at 237.
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defendant sought to introduce testimony by an expert who would
have given his opinion on the legal conclusions to be drawn from
the evidence. ls4 In affirming the trial court's refusal to admit the
evidence, the Fifth Circuit panel stated that the Federal Rules of
Evidence generally do not allow a witness to "give legal conclu-
sions."lss The court reasoned that allowing the expert to give his
opinion on the legal conclusions to be drawn from the evidence
would both invade the trial court's province and be irrelevant. 1S6
In 1977, the Fifth Circuit addressed a case involving a book-
making organization. The court stated in United States v. Milton
that the judiciary must "remain vigilant against the admission of
legal conclusions, and an expert witness may not substitute for the
court in charging the jury regarding the applicable law."ls7 This
same theme had been sounded in a still earlier Fifth Circuit
decision, which noted the importance of protecting the role of the
judge in instructing the jury on the applicable law. In Huff v.
United States, the plaintiff had attempted to introduce expert
testimony regarding the construction and interpretation of customs,
laws, statutes, rules, and regulations. ISS The court of appeals noted
that the Government, as a party prosecutor, could not be permitted
to substitute its witness for the trial court in charging the jury as
to the applicable law in the case. 159
The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of expert legal testimony
in United States v. Zipkin, decided in 1984.160 In Zipkin, an
appointed receiver of a bankrupt estate was charged with embez-
zlement. 161 The district court permitted the plaintiff's expert wit-
nesses to testify about bankruptcy law and the law's application
in the case with regard to interim compensation for receivers. 162
Additionally, the district court allowed the bankruptcy judge pre-
siding over the estate's bankruptcy proceedings to testify regarding
the proper interpretation of an order he had made concerning the
payment of fees to the receiver.163 The Sixth Circuit held that this
testimony was inadmissible and that the error in admitting it was
reversible because only the judge can properly instruct the jury on
154. [d. at 239-40.
155. [d. at 240.
156. [d.
157. 555 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1977).
158. 273 F.2d 56, 61 (5th Cir. 1959).
159. [d.
160. 729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984).
161. [d. at 386.
162. [d.
163. [d.
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the applicable principle~ of law. l64 The court of appeals further
noted that expert testimony on the law is properly excluded because
a trial judge does not need the assistance of witnesses to determine
the applicable law. 165
In a recent Seventh Circuit case, Harbor Insurance Co. v.
Continental Bank Corp., 166 the court stated that a lawyer could
not testify as an expert on the meaning of "indemnity" in the
defendant-bank's charter. l67 Harbor Insurance Company was re-
quired, under their policy, to indemnify a director or officer of
Continental Bank for wrongful acts committed by them, if under
the Bank's charter the bank itself was required or permitted to
indemnify the director or officer. 168 Therefore, the insurer's liability
was dependent upon the meaning of "indemnify" under the Bank's
charter. The court stated that, because the language of the charter
was ambiguous, either party could introduce evidence regarding
the true meaning.169 Although the court acknowledged that a lawyer
was a proper witness to provide an opinion regarding the meaning
of the charter, the lawyer-witness in this case had gone further at
trial and based his opinion on judicial opinionsyo By allowing the
lawyer to testify on the conclusions of his legal research, the
district judge improperly "allowed the jury to infer that it could
look to that witness for legal guidance."171 In effect, this amounted
to the judge vouching for one side's theory of the case. According
to the appellate court, "by doing this the judge impermissibly
tilted the balance of power between the parties."172 Thus, the court
of appeals concluded that the district court was incorrect in allow-
ing the lawyer to testify on the legal meaning of indemnification.173
Earlier, the Seventh Circuit decided United States v. Baskes. 174
In Baskes, the defendant was convicted of obstructing the assess-
ment and collection of income and gift taxes by the Internal
Revenue Service.175 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the
major premise that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not allow
164. [d. at 387.
165. [d.
166. 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990).
167. [d. at 366.
168. [d. at 359.
169. [d. at 365.




174. 649 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1000 (1981).
175. [d. at 473.
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experts to testify on the legal implications of conduct.176 The court
of appeals explained that expert testimony must be helpful to a
clear understanding of specific facts in issue.177 Because expert
legal testimony on the legal implications of conduct could not
possibly aid the jury in understanding facts in issue, the district
court's decision not to admit the testimony was affirmed. 178
In Farmland Industries v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, the
Eighth Circuit recently held that an expert witness cannot testify
regarding the requirements of the law.179 In Farmland, the plaintiff
claimed that the defendants conspired to defraud the plaintiff by
trading in oil futures contracts without authorization. 180 The district
court refused to allow the plaintiff's expert witness to testify
regarding the federal agency's rules pertaining to the defendant's
conduct.181 The court of appeals approved the trial court's refusal
and stated that the special legal knowledge of the judge rendered
the witness's testimony superfluous.182 The panel further explained
that, " '[t]he admission of such testimony would give the appear-
ance that the court was shifting to witnesses the responsibility to
decide the case."'183
In 1974, the Ninth Circuit decided Cooley v. United States. l84
The defendant in Cooley was convicted for willfully and knowingly
failing to fIle a tax return. 18S In upholding the trial court's ruling
that copies of case decisions were inadmissible, the court of appeals
pointedly noted that the law is given to the jury by the court and
is not introduced into evidence.186 The court of appeals invoked a
functional analysis: "It is the function of the jury to determine
the facts from the evidence and apply the law as given by the
court to the facts."187
176. [d. at 479.
177. [d. at 478.
178. [d. In a still earlier decision, the Seventh Circuit had stated that "[t]he question
of interpretation of the contract is for the jury and the question of legal effect is for the
judge. In neither case do we permit expert testimony." Loeb v. Hammond, 407 F.2d 779,
781 (7th Cir. 1969); see also United States v. Windfelder, 790 F.2d 576, 580-82 (7th Cir.
1986) (testimony concerning criminal defendant's mental state would be inappropriate).
179. 871 F.2d 1402, 1409 (8th Cir. 1989).
180. [d. at 1404.
181. [d. at 1409.
182. [d.
183. [d. (quoting Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 50S, 510 (2d Cir.), eer!.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977».
184. 501 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1974), eer!. denied, 419 U.S. 1123 (1975).
185. [d. at 1250.
186. [d. at 1253.
187. [d.
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The Tenth Circuit addressed the admissibility of expert legal
testimony in Specht v. Jensen, decided in 1988.188 The court of
appeals directly addressed the issue of whether Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 permits an attorney who is called as an expert witness
to state his views on the law that governs the verdict. 189 The
plaintiff wanted to introduce the testimony of an attorney who
would testify regarding the reasonableness of a search. l90 The
attorney was allowed to testify as an expert witness that the search
was conducted in an illegal manner.191 The Tenth Circuit considered
whether "the expert encroached upon the trial court's [function
and] authority to instruct the jury upon the applicable law."I92
The court noted that "it is axiomatic that the judge is the sole
arbiter of the law and its applicability."193 The court concluded
that "it would be a waste of time if witnesses or counsel should
duplicate the judge's statement of the law, and it would intolerably
confound the jury to have it stated differently. "194 The court also
invoked the Advisory Committee's note to Rule 704 which "em-
phasize[d] that testimony on ultimate questions of law is not
favored." 195 The Tenth Circuit, making the analogy that testimony
on the law amounts to directing a verdict rather than assisting the
jury's understanding, held that the expert testimony was improperly
admitted into evidence. l96 The court concluded, in no uncertain
terms, that "[i]n no instance can a witness be permitted to define
the law of the case."197
In another recent decision, the Eleventh Circuit held that an
expert witness is not allowed to testify regarding the legal inter-
pretation of a contract. In Montgomery v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 198 the court of appeals addressed a case regarding an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty in an insurance contract. The
188. 853 F.2d 80S (10th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989).
189. [d. at 806-07.
190. [d. at 806.
191. [d. at 807.
192. [d.
193. [d.
194. [d. (citing Stoebuck, supra note 62, at 237).
195. [d. at 808.
196. [d. The court also noted that there are at least two other problems inherent in the
introduction of expert testimony upon legal issues. [d. at 809. The jury may believe that
the expert knows more about the law than the judge and therefore ignore the judge's
instructions. [d. (citing Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 50S (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977». Additionally, the expert may present legal testimony which
differs from that of the judge and, therefore, confuses the jurors. [d.
197. [d. at 810.
198. 898 F.2d 1537, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990).
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insurance policy provided that the insurer would be legally liable
for all costs involved in defending suits against the insured. l99 The
insured alleged that the insurer breached the insurance contract by
not providing a tax attorney in a suit contesting a tax-status
determination by the Internal Revenue Service.2°O The insured
offered expert testimony regarding the legal duty of the insurer
under the policy.201 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision to admit the testimony.202 The court squarely held that an
expert "may not testify to the legal implications of conduct. "203
The trial judge "must be the jury's only source of law."204
Significantly, then, the majority rule is so well-established that
it is often deemed a basic premise or assumption of evidence law-
a kind of axiomatic principle. Precedent for the reasoning detailed
in Part II of this Article generally holds sway in eight of the twelve
regional courts of appeals.20S Some confusion of precedent exists,
however, which is centered in the Fifth Circuit and is spilling over
into other circuits. These ersatz precedents often have to do with
199. [d. at 1538-39.
200. [d. at 1539-40.
201. [d. at 1540.
202. [d. at 1541.
203. [d.
204. [d. at 1541.
205. In addition to the courts of appeals, several district courts likewise have deemed
expert legal testimony to be inadmissible. In 1987, the Southern District of New York held
that an affidavit of a lawyer who qualified as an expert in trademark law could not be
introduced into evidence. Motown Productions v. Cacomm, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 285, 288
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 849 F.2d 781 (2d Cir. 1988). The court ruled
that the expert testimony of a lawyer as to the ultimate issue of domestic law or as to the
legal significance of facts was plainly inadmissible. [d. In 1986, the Western District of
Pennsylvania held that a report by a lawyer otherwise qualified as an expert was inadmissible
because it did not aid in the jury's understanding of facts in the case. King v. Fox Grocery
Co., 642 F. Supp. 288, 291 (W.D. Pa. 1986). The Southern District of Ohio has held that
the Rules of Evidence did not permit expert testimony on the law. Payne v. A.O. Smith
Corp., 627 F. Supp. 226, 228 (S.D. Ohio 1985). The court held that "the Court, not a
witness, may instruct the jury as to the applicable law in this action." [d. Furthermore,
the court noted that this was clearly the law in the Sixth Circuit. [d. (citing United States
v. Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384, 387 (6th Cir. 1984); Stoler v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 583 F.2d
896, 899 (6th Cir. 1978». In 1983, the Eastern District of New York held that an expert's
testimony upon the applicable law was inadmissible in light of the significant policy against
allowing trials before juries to become "battles of paid advocates posing as experts on the
respective sides concerning matters of domestic law." DiBella v. County of Suffolk, 574
F. Supp. 151, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing Marx & Co. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d
505, 511 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977». In 1979, the Western District of
Pennsylvania simply held that "[t]here is nothing in Rule 702 which would allow an expert
to interpret a legal document and substitute his judgment for that of the court." Eastern
Assoc. Coal Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 475 F. Supp. 586, 592 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
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the mental state element in criminal cases or with similar issues.
B. Decisions Allowing Expert Legal Testimony
Existing alongside the numerous decisions that disapprove of
expert legal testimonyt are several decisions which have held expert
legal testimony to be admissible-for one reason or another.
In 1981 t the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Fogg.206 In
Foggt the defendantt an executive of a food store chaint was
charged with receiving illegal kickbacks from an orange juice
supplier.207 The defendant allegedly overpaid the supplier for the
juice and the supplier refunded the excess to the defendant.208 In
the income tax evasion prosecutiont the Internal Revenue Service
offered an expert witness to testify before the jury that the pay-
ments received by the defendant amounted to constructive divi-
dends from the defendanes corporation to the defendanU09 The
witness based his opinion on the Internal Revenue Code and his
experience as an internal revenue agent.210 The court of appeals
held that the admission of the expertts testimony was not reversible
error because he had merely stated his opiniont and the presen-
tation did not encroach on the role of the court.211
In 1981 t the Fifth Circuit issued a similar opinion in Huddleston
v. Herman & MacLean.212 In Huddleston t the plaintiffs alleged
that the defendant violated securities regulations in its public
offering of securities.213 The plaintiffs offered an expert in the
securities industry to testify concerning the interpretation given to
the boilerplate language of the prospectus.214 The expert witness
testified that the only relevant statement concerning the risk of
the investment was in the form of a standard statement used in
every prospectus.21S The Fifth Circuit held that the expert testimony
on the interpretation of the prospectus was admissible because it
was relevant to the scienter element.216
206. 652 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
207. [d. at 553-54.
208. [d. at 554.
209. [d. at 555.
210. See id. at 555-56.
211. [d. at 556-57.
212. 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981).
213. [d. at 539.
214. [d. at 552.
215. [d.
216. [d. See also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294-95 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding no abuse of discretion in allowing law professor's testimony concerning the
requirements of tax forms because the testimony was general background evidence and the
trial judge gave limiting instruction). This is analogous to expert testimony in legal
malpractice cases. See supra text accompanying notes 108-15.
HeinOnline -- 40 U. Kan. L. Rev. 354 1991-1992
354 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
The Eighth Circuit decided United States v. Bednar in 1984.217
In Bednar, the defendant was indicted for making false entries in
his company's computer records in violation of federal securities
regulations.218 Over the objection of the defendant, the Government
offered an expert witness to testify that the records involved in
the case were required to be kept according to the securities rules
and regulations.219 The court of appeals upheld the admission of
the evidence and affirmed the conviction.22O
In Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld
the use of expert legal testimony.221 The plaintiff had sued the
defendants alleging that the defendants churned their investment
accounts resulting in high commissions for the defendant at the
expense of the plaintiff.222 The plaintiff admitted that he agreed
to the investment but alleged that the defendant represented it as
a conservative investment.223 At trial, the plaintiff offered an expert
to testify on the significance of the various transactions and
whether the completion of those transactions evidenced reckless
disregard of the plaintiff's interest.224 The Ninth Circuit held that
exclusion of the plaintiff's expert witness testimony prevented the
plaintiff from presenting his case to the jury and remanded for a
new trial.22s
In 1986, the Tenth Circuit held that the Government's expert
legal testimony was properly admitted to explain the requirements
of firearm registration statutes. In United States v. Buchanan,226
the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in allowing
the prosecution to present an expert witness to testify that the
explosive device which exploded in the defendant's home was a
"firearm" requiring registration under the applicable statutes.227
217. 728 F.2d 1043 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827 (1984).
218. Id. at 1045-46.
219. Id. at 1048.
220. Id.; see also Hogan v. AT&T, 812 F.2d 409, 412 (8th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(finding no abuse of discretion in allowing opinion testimony regarding the existence of
discriminatory acts because the lay meaning of "to discriminate" is similar to the legal
meaning).
221. 799 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1986).
222. Id. at 526.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 527.
225. Id. at 530; see also United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1987)
(finding no error in allowing expert testimony on a regulation when the regulation was
explained correctly and the jury was aided in understanding the complex case), cert. denied
sub nom. Forde v. United States, 488 U.S. 974 (1988).
226. 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986).
227. See id. at 483.
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The court of appeals noted that the issue "involved the consider-
ation of a particular homemade device against an array of statutory
definitions."228 The court upheld the conviction noting that "[u]nder
such circumstances, the courts have admitted this sort of testi-
mony."229
In an earlier decision, the Tenth Circuit also allowed the testi-
mony of an expert on the interpretation and application of the
rules of the National Association of Security Dealers.23o In United
States v. Jensen, the defendant was convicted of violating federal
securities regulations by committing fraud in the solicitation and
sale of certain securities.231 The court of appeals began its analysis
by explaining that an "expert witness cannot state legal conclusions
by applying law to the facts, passing upon weight or credibility of
the evidence, or usurping the province of the jury by telling it
what result should be reached. "232 However, the Tenth Circuit
panel upheld the conviction and the admission of the testimony
because "with respect to a self-governing rule of a private asso-
ciation," the expert legal testimony was not a legal conclusion.233
These decisions, quantitatively described as a "minority rule,"
may best be characterized qualitatively as mistakes of precedent.
They might be explained away as the West Publishing Company
key number system gone awry. There can be no denying that they
exist. The only argument here is that they are properly considered
somewhat as "sports" of evidence law in which a district court's
error is compounded on appeal.
C. The Confusing Precedent of United States v. Garber
In the Fifth Circuit and in other courts of appeals, one rather
curious decision seems to have had a life of its own as a precedent
to allow expert testimony on the law. This confusion of precedent
requires separate discussion here.
In 1979, the Fifth Circuit decided United States v. Garber,234
perhaps establishing the basis for a new cliche that odd facts and
228. [d.
229. [d.; see also Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1487 (lOth Cir. 1987)
(government agency's approval of safety measures is relevant, and the mode of introducing
evidence of that approval does not affect relevance).
230. United States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 1349, 1356 (10th Cir. 1979).
231. [d. at 1352.
232. [d. at 1356.
233. [d.
234. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally Garner, supra note 25; Schaefer, supra
note 74.
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en banc courts establish odd law.235 In Garber, the defendant was
indicted for willfully and knowingly attempting to evade income
tax liability by filing a false and fraudulent income tax return.236
The defendant had a rare antibody in her blood plasma and sold
it periodically for substantial sums of money.237 In addition to the
funds she received from the sale of her plasma, the defendant also
received a weekly salary.238 It was undisputed that the plaintiff
only paid taxes on the money received as salary.239 In order to
succeed in its prosecution, the Government had to show: (1) a tax
deficiency; (2) an affirmative act constituting tax evasion or at-
tempted evasion; and (3) willfulness.240 The Government attempted
to introduce the testimony of a lawyer who was a qualified expert
in tax law.241 The Government's expert witness was to testify that
the income received by the plaintiff was gross income under the
Internal Revenue Code.242 In rebuttal, the defendant offered the
testimony of a certified public accountant who concluded the
money received by the defendant was not taxable income according
to the Internal Revenue Code.243 The district court listened to the
2350 The decision was by the former Fifth Circuit en bane, and, therefore, created
circuit precedent for the new Fifth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit. See Thomas E. Baker,
A Primer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, 34 MERCER L. REv. 1175, 1185-88 (1983);
Thomas E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J.
725, 737 (1982).
The 1979 decision is significant, as well as unfortunate, because it was the first en banc
decision on expert legal witnesses after the July I, 1975 effective date of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Prior to the decision, there were some few and unclear precedents upholding
the use of expert witnesses on the law in peculiar situations. See Schaefer, supra note 74,
at 4540 The en banc court made the mistake of perpetuating this uncertainty and missed
the opportunity to purge these precedents. Id. at 454-55. Inexplicably, the en banc majority
opinion never mentions the then-new Rules of Evidence. Id. at 458-59.
After this Article was written, but before it was published, the Fifth Circuit en banc
reconsidered the general rules for the admissibility of expert witness testimony and seemed
to encourage district judges to be more skeptical and less hospitable to proffers of expert
scientific testimony. Curiously, the 1991 decision does not discuss Garber. See Christo-
phersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); see also Gary
Taylor, Expert Witness Opinion Eyed, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3 (suggesting the issue
is ripe for Supreme Court review).
236. 607 F.2d at 93.
237. Ido at 93-94. In 1970 alone, the plaintiff was paid $80,200 for her plasma. Id. at
94 n.1.
238. Ido at 94. The plaintiff received a weekly salary of $200. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. See generally Michael E. Tigar, "Willfulness" and "Ignorance" in Federal
Criminal Law, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 525 (1989); Elizabeth Baliou Gibbs, Comment, Blood
Money: New Skirmishes on the Sale/Service Frontier, 31 MERCER L. REv. 1047 (1980).
241. 607 F.2d at 94.
242. Id. The lawyer based his opinion upon I.R.C. § 61(a) (1954).
243. Id. at 95.
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proffers of testimony from both experts outside the presence of
the jury, but refused to admit their opinions because the question
of taxability was deemed to be a question for the court, not the
jury, to decide.244 The district court then ruled, as a matter of
law, that the income received by the defendant was taxable in-
come.24S
On appeal, the en banc majority of the Fifth Circuit emphasized
that because the district court "reserved to itself the job of
unriddling the tax law," it had completely obscured the most
important theory of the defendant's defense.246 The majority rea-
soned that the defendant could not have willfully evaded the tax
if a reasonable doubt existed in the law regarding the taxability
of the income.247 The majority further stated that the result did
not depend upon the defendant's knowledge of the confused state
of the law, because even if the defendant had sought professional
advice, no clear legal answer would have been forthcoming.248 One
cannot read the majority opinion without detecting a sense of
appellate suspicion of the Internal Revenue Service and a corre-
sponding appellate sympathy for the taxpayer-defendant.249 Addi-
tionally, the majority stated that "[i]n a case such as this where
the element of willfulness is critical to the defense, the defendant
is entitled to wide latitude in the introduction of evidence tending
to show lack of intent."25o Finally, the majority relied, incorrectly,
on precedent that admits expert legal testimony on questions of
foreign law.251 Two dissenting opinions, supported by four judges,
took issue with the majority's evidentiary holding by writing cri-
244. [d. at 94-95.
245. [d. at 96.
246. [d. at 97.
247. [d. at 97-98. The majority noted that "when the taxability of unreported income
is problematical as a matter of law, the unresolved nature of the law is relevant to show
that [the] defendant may not have been aware of a tax liability or may have simply made
an error in judgment." [d. at 98.
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court held that a good-faith misunderstanding of the
law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or
not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. Cheek v. United
States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609-12 (1991). The Supreme Court also held that the defendant's
views about the validity of the tax laws are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and should
not be heard by the jury. [d. at 612. The majority based the holding on statutory grounds
and did not reach the arguable constitutional issues involved. [d. at 613 n.11.
248. 607 F.2d at 98-99.
249. "A criminal proceeding pursuant to section 7201 is an inappropriate vehicle for
pioneering interpretations of tax law." [d. at 100.
250. [d. at 99.
251. [d. at 100; see supra part II.D.
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tiques that mirror the discussion and reach the same conclusion
of inadmissability reached in Part II of this Article.252
In the years since the Garber decision, the Fifth Circuit has
decided several cases in which one would expect reliance on the
Garber precedent. Instead, the Fifth Circuit more often than not,
has distinguished these cases from Garber. Many commentators
have been critical of Garber and have suggested that the precedent
should be, if it has not already been, limited to its peculiar facts.253
There is good reason to believe that the Fifth Circuit itself has
come to feel that way about the precedent.
In 1980, a Fifth Circuit panel decided United States v. Herzog.254
The defendant in Herzog was convicted of willfully supplying false
and fraudulent information on an income tax withholding-exemp-
tion statement.25S The defendant testified that he completed an
"extensive study of federal income tax law and constitutional law"
after which he concluded that he could be legally taxed only upon
making a profit.256 The defendant explained that he did not pay
taxes on his wages because he had concluded that his wages were
not profit.25~ The controlling issue for the jury was whether the
defendant filed the improper forms under an honest, although
erroneous, belief that his wages were exempt.258
The defendant proffered testimony by an expert in income tax
law.259 The expert would have testified about the extreme com-
plexity of the tax laws and the substantial amount of literature
concerning the complexity of those laws.260 On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit approved the district court's exclusion of the expert's
252. 607 F.2d at 101, 105-07, (Ainsworth, J., dissenting); [d. at 109, 112-16 (Tjoflat,
J., dissenting). See generally Joshua Stein, Note, Criminal Liability for Willful Evasion of
an Uncertain Tax, 81 COLOM. L. REv. 1348 (1981). Nowhere did the majority explain how
and why expert testimony by a lawyer would pass muster under Rule 702. The issue was
whether a layperson honestly or even reasonably believed a certain proposition about the
law. The defendant ought to be allowed to present the jury with the underlying information
or knowledge the defendant had and then the lay jurors ought to be allowed to draw their
own inferences about the honesty or reasonableness of the claimed belief. The lay jurors
are, in fact, better situated to make that determination than a lawyer-expert witness.
253. See, e.g., United States v. Ingredient Technology Corp., 698 F.2d 88, 96-98 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983); Leibson, supra note 78, at 22; Schaefer, supra
note 74, at 447; Stein, supra note 252, at 1348-53; Note, supra note 77, at
801-03.
254. 632 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1980).
255. [d. at 470.
256. [d. at 471.
257. [d.
258. [d. at 473.
259. [d.
260. [d.
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proffered testimony because the witness's opinion regarding the
complexity of the tax laws was irrelevant to the determination of
the defendant's individual confusion regarding the tax law.261 The
court distinguished Garber, stating that the defense in Garber had
argued that the testimony of the expert was " 'to show that doubt
existed as to whether a tax was due because it was incapable of
being computed, and to demonstrate the vagueness of the law,
which would preclude a willful intent to violate it'. "262 The Fifth
Circuit reasoned that because the defendant in Herzog was charged
with making a false report, "no amount of expert testimony could
help him in this regard. "263
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Burton
further narrowed the Garber holding.2M In Burton, the defendant
was convicted of failing to file income tax returns.265 The defendant
argued that the district court erred in excluding expert legal testi-
mony concerning the legal uncertainty over whether wages are
income under the Internal Revenue Code.266 The Fifth Circuit
approved the district court's exclusion of the testimony.267 The
defendant testified that he had a good faith belief that the wages
were not income and, therefore, lacked the requisite intent to
violate the law.26s The court of appeals agreed that "a bona fide
misunderstanding of the tax laws can negate the essential element
of willfulness," but concluded that any erroneous legal views that
the defendant might have held could be described by the trial
judge in his instruction to the jury regarding good faith. 269 The
court explicitly distinguished Garber by characterizing that decision
as having been made "in response to a decision by the trial court
that the prior uncertainty of the legal question was not relevant
to the jury's decision."27o According to the Burton panel, "[w]hile
the legal decision of taxability was for the judge, the uncertainty
and doubt which had previously existed were yet relevant to the
defendant's [Garber's] state of mind."271 The court continued:
We are persuaded that, apart from those few cases where the legal
duty pointed to is so uncertain as to approach the level of vagueness,
261. Id.
262. Id. (quoting United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 96 (5th Cir. 1979».
263. Id.
264. 737 F.2d 439, 444 (5th Cir. 1984).




269. Id. at 441-43.
270. Id. at 444.
271. Id.
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the abstract question of legal uncertainty of which a defendant was
unaware is of marginal relevance. . . . [lJn other cases the judge will
ordinarily be the sole source of the law.272
The Fifth Circuit narrowed Garber even further, in United States
v. Daly.273 In Daly, the defendant was a disbarred attorney and
convicted tax evader who gained control of a church which had
been granted a tax-exempt status.274 The defendant attempted to
introduce expert testimony on the alleged confusion of the appli-
cable tax law for the purpose of negating the element of willful-
ness.275 The district court excluded the evidence as irrelevant.276
The Fifth Circuit characterized the controlling precedents, stating
that "[i]n United States v. Burton, this court limited Garber to
its bizarre facts-where the level of uncertainty approached legal
vagueness. "277 In holding that the district court correctly excluded
the expert testimony, the Daly panel stated that "the relevance of
the expert's testimony on plausible readings of the Internal Revenue
Code can be easily outweighed by considerations of potential
prejudice and of confusing the jury, especially considering that the
judge is the jury's sole source of information regarding the law."278
Thus, the Garber holding may be characterized as something of
a Fifth Circuit curiosity of precedent which was decided upon
peculiar facts and which has been limited by the Fifth Circuit
virtually-but not quite-to the point of being overruled.
Outside the Fifth Circuit, other circuits also have distinguished
or limited the application of the Garber decision. In United States
v. Ingredient Technology Corp., the Second Circuit explicitly re-
fused to follow Garber.279 The Second Circuit first noted that in
a tax fraud case, the element of willfulness requires factual evidence
of the defendant's state of mind.280 The court noted secondly that
questions of law are for the court and that admission into evidence
272. [do
273. 756 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1022 (1985).
274. [d. at 1078.
275. [d. at 1083.
276. [d.
277. [d.; see Stein, supra note 252, at 1359-64.
2780 Daly, 756 F02d at 1083. The issue in Daly was whether the lawyer-defendant
honestly believed the law to be as he supposed, i.e., whether his innocent belief negated
the mental element for the crime. Arguably, the expert legal testimony was circumstantially
relevant; the more objectively uncertain the body of law, the easier it is to infer that the
lawyer-defendant actually formed the belief he claimed. Thus, the evidence had an even
stronger claim for admissibility than the evidence in Garber, which involved a lay defendant.
279. 698 F.2d 88, 97 (2d Cir. 1983).
280. See id.
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of expert opinions on the law therefore would confuse the jury.281
Likewise, in 1986, the Sixth Circuit expressly declined to follow
Garber, in United States v. Curtis.282 In Curtis, the appellate court
addressed the defendant's tax evasion conviction.283 The Govern-
ment made a motion in limine to exclude a defense witness's expert
testimony that the applicable tax law was complex and unsettled.284
The district court granted the motion and ruled that the defendant
could present expert evidence only if the defendant could also
establish that he had specifically relied upon the expert's advice.28s
The defendant argued that this ruling violated his right to a fair
trial and based his argument directly upon the Garber decision.286
The Sixth Circuit stated that "[a]fter carefully reviewing Garber
... this court declines to follow and rejects Garber."287 The Sixth
Circuit panel reasoned that Garber had the effect of distorting the
role of expert witnesses and their purpose and function in the
adversarial trial.288 The panel emphasized that experts function to
interpret and to analyze factual evidence.289 Experts do not testify
about the law because the judge's special legal knowledge is
presumed to be sufficient; the judge's role and duty is to inform
the jury about the applicable law.290 The Sixth Circuit concluded:
The jury is not composed of lawyers; the typical juror is untrained in
legal affairs. To attempt to explain the myriad rules of judicial construc-
tion, the complexity of legal principles, or the function of precedent
would hopelessly divert the jury from their preeminent duty of assessing
appellant's guiIt.291
Thus, Garber may be characterized, finally, as something of an
oddity in Fifth Circuit precedent which has not commended itself
to the other appellate courts that have addressed the issue with
due diligence and care.
281. ld.
282. 782 F.2d 593, 599 (6th Cir. 1986).
283. ld. at 593-94.
284. ld. at 598.
285. ld.; cf. 1 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3){b)(1968) (reasonable reliance must be based
on an official statement of law); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL
LAW § 5.1, at 418-20 (2d ed. 1986).
286. 782 F.2d at 598.




291. ld. at 600 {citing United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 105 (5th Cir. 1979)
(Ainsworth, J., dissenting)).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Expert legal testimony should not be admitted into evidence.
Despite the liberalization of the Federal Rules of Evidence, "it
remains black-letter law that expert legal testimony is not permis-
sible. "292 Expert legal testimony does not meet the requirement of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because the evidence is not helpful
in assisting the jury in the determination of issues of fact. The
judge is the sole authority on the law and its interpretation.293
Even proponents of expert legal testimony must admit that "[t]his
simple proposition is so basic . . . it scarcely needs repeating. "294
The jury's function is to evaluate the facts in the light of the
applicable law which, in turn, is determined by the judge.295
Historically, there always has been an assumption of judicial
expertise, which amounts to a license for the judge to take a kind
of judicial notice of domestic law, without formal pleading or
proof, from whatever study sources the judge may choose to rely.
Expert testimony does not assist the jury regarding the interpre-
tation or application of the relevant law. This is particularly so if
expert legal testimony from different witnesses is conflicting or if
an expert's testimony does not comport with the judge's formu-
lation of the law. Such evidence from dueling experts fails the
helpfulness standard and should be excluded.296
Expert legal testimony should also be excluded under an analysis
of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. When conflicting evidence of
the applicable law is placed before the jury, the jury may become
confused and may apply an incorrect standard.297 Additionally,
this kind of testimony is superfluous in light of the judge's
presumed special knowledge of the law.298 We go to a great deal
of trouble to nominate and to confirm federal judges. Our legiti-
292. Note, supra note 77, at 797; see also 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion
Evidence § 136, at 143 (1989); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 453, at 94 (1964); MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
HANDBooK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 704.1, at 644 (1981); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 3, at 31; 3 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 25, 1702[02), at 702-33.
293. See Olicker, supra note 91, at 862.
294. ld.
295. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 3, § 12; Note, supra note 77, at 811-
12.
296. Note, supra note 77, at 811. Compare Veronica Serrato, Expert Testimony in
Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REv. 155 (1988) (certain
types of expert witness testimony are helpful in child sexual abuse cases) with Pamela A.
Wilk, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and Effective Use in
Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AMER. U. L. REv. 417 (1984) (when the defense is consent,
expert witness testimony is useful for providing evidence of the victim's rape trauma
syndrome).
297. Note, supra note 77, at 881.
298. See, e.g., Zoeller & Lynch, supra note 40, at 123-24.
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mate expectation is that these men and women as a group represent
the elite of the profession, in both learning and experience.
The remaining argument for the admission of expert legal tes-
timony is that it may help the particular judge who may not be
fully knowledgeable regarding the applicable law. Even those few
federal judges who, according to snide commentators, now wear
robes principally because they were college roommates of some
Senator, have the best and the brightest of law clerks, whose
employment justification is to perform legal research. Besides the
elbow clerks in chambers, there are central staff attorneys on
whom to rely. The judge simply has several more traditional
options available to provide the requisite knowledge without ad-
mitting expert legal testimony in the presence of the jury.
Let us not forget the attorneys in the case.299 They have every
professional motivation to research and present the law in their
memoranda, briefs, and arguments in the most able, complete,
and effective manner possible. Most practicing attorneys have
heard some variation of that weekend-ruining phrase, delivered
with judicial solemnity, "The court will take the matter under
advisement, and counsel will submit memoranda on the issue by
Monday."
If the jury is allowed to hear evidence regarding the applicable
law and its interpretation, where will the proverbial line ultimately
be drawn? When questions regarding the admissibility of evidence
arise, should the litigants present expert legal testimony on the
applicable law and permit the jury to make the evidentiary ruling?
Should we allow the litigants to present all relevant evidence and
permit the confused jurors to decide the outcome without any
judicial guidance, relying as best they can on experts hired by both
sides? Obviously, admitting expert legal testimony raises many
other questions concerning the proper roles of the trial participants.
The door cannot be opened without addressing all of these ques-
tions. It has long been the function of the judge to decide and
instruct the jury on the applicable law. Until a persuasive argument
is made that submission of expert legal testimony has a benefit
that cannot be achieved by another alternative, courts should refuse
to admit it before the jury. Many of the same arguments can be
made for a like prohibition at bench trials.
299. An attorney called as an expert witness performs in an incongruous role. In another
context, the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILITY EC 5-9 (1977), describes the
incongruity: "The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function of
an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to state
facts objectively."
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Expert testimony on domestic law is unnecessary. Conceptually,
the trial judge is charged with the function and responsibility for
knowing the law and for resolving questions of law. Practically
and historically, if the judge does require assistance in determining
the law, the traditional sources-research by the judge and the
filing of supplemental memoranda by the advocates-have proved
to be adequate, and are without doubt superior to expert testimony
on the law, with its attendant complications and risks.
